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I. INTRODUCTION
"The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these
days apace."' It is doubtful that the master stylist, Justice Cardozo,
could have foreseen how adaptable his metaphor would prove to be.
Dean Prosser, himself a stylist of note, used it in his classic descrip-
tions of the "fall" of the privity of contract defense in products
liability cases.2 It is he who is primarily responsible for burning the
dictum into the memory of a generation of lawyers.3 Can others of
us who use it be blamed for recognizing a good thing when we see it?
Another "assault" which is going forward in the consumer sales
area has as its objective ("citadel") the use of negotiable notes or
waiver-of-defense clauses in contracts, whereby Transferee of Dealer
may successfully proceed against Buyer despite the existence of a
defense (such as failure of consideration or breach of warranty) which
the latter could interpose if sued by Dealer. The ornithological
breakdown of the combatants, who on occasion will remark that this
is "a different kind of war," is roughly as follows: the "hawks" come
mainly from the ranks of the academic community and the executive
branch of the government. The "doves" are, for the most part,
businessmen engaged in consumer credit activity. Judges and legis-
lators can be found in both camps, and there are a wide variety of
other species.
The militant "hawk" sees this war as part of the "larger struggle"
for the protection of consumers ("victims of aggression"), and he
presses for total abolition ("unconditional surrender"). He is, there-
fore, disinclined to negotiate a compromise, believing that such a
negotiated settlement ("appeasement") would only encourage the
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
lUltrameres Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
2 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MWNN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
3 A student who quoted the Cardozo dictum in his examination booklet ap-
pended this postscript: "I want you to know this is the first thing I have memorized
since The Charge of the Light Brigade in the seventh grade."
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enemy to greater, long-term effort. He favors escalation of the con-
flict and demands nothing short of military victory.
The extreme "dove," on the other hand, believes the war to be
totally misconceived and misdirected. ("The wrong war, in the wrong
place, at the wrong time.") He sees it as but another attempt by the
"establishment" ("the industrial-military complex") to -impinge upon
the freedom of market participants to handle their own affairs. He
questions whether there can be such a thing as a real military victory
and insists the war effort is diverting resources from "domestic"
programs, such as consumer "education." In short, he favors "uni-
lateral withdrawal."
The "citadel" in this instance appears to be firmly established
in both law and practice. The emergence in our legal system of the
concept of negotiability has been of inestimable value in facilitating
commercial transactions. It is an important part of "the triumph of
the good faith purchaser," aptly characterized as "one of the most
dramatic episodes in our legal history."4 A high-energy economic
system is dependent upon the free flow of commerce; accordingly,
impediments to voluntary commercial exchange should be kept to
a minimum.5 If the purchaser of a right evidenced by a negotiable
note can prevail despite the availability of "personal defenses" of the
maker, the inducement to purchase will be intensified. Increasing
the purchaser's risk, as by refusing to provide insulation against such
defenses of the maker, would, inexorably, tend to depress purchases.
This all builds toward the implementation of a basic policy or pre-
supposition of our commercial law structure: that a high volume of
economic exchange is a prime social desideratum. 0 Similarly, the
freedom of contracting parties to insert in the agreement a clause
whereby one of them waives certain defenses as against the other's
transferee will likely have the salutary effect of expediting transac-
tions. Indeed, the insertion of a waiver clause is an attempt to achieve
"negotiability by contract"; i.e., an attempt to invest the contract
4 Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
5 See generally I. PATERSON, THm GOD OF THE MACHlINE (1964), for a fascinating
study of the political, economic and social conditions believed to be conducive to a
dynamic economy.
6 "I do not think there is any single fact more important for men to recognize,
with all its implications, than this single one-that their individual well.being, as well
as that of the whole society, is determined by the volume of exchanges going on in
the whole society." H. ScH-amaN, THE PROMISES MEN LVE By 393 (1938) (italics In
original).
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with negotiable qualities without compliance with the usual statutory
formalities of negotiable instruments. There is here, also, the added
fact that our tradition has been one of maximizing the power of
parties to establish, by agreement, the obligations they wish to
assume. This freedom of contract is but one manifestation of a basic
freedom of thought and action endemic to our social system. Even as
to that minority group called businessmen, we presume a permission
to do whatever is not lawfully forbidden. The burden of justifying a
limitation upon freedom of action, including freedom of contract, is
upon the one who insists upon the restraint. Professor Havighurst
put it well: "Just as there must be 'freedom for the thought that we
hate,' so there must also be, in a measure, freedom for the contract
that we hate."7
II. "THE ASSAULT UPON THE CrrADEL..
The "assault" is mounted by an impressive coalition of forces,
employing the most potent and sophisticated of weapons. The attack
is coordinated with a massive effort being waged in the courts, the
legislatures, the legal periodicals, the popular press, and elsewhere,
under the banner of "consumer protection" or "consumer rights."
Neither the general war nor the isolated battle is new to our time,8
but the conflict is building to unprecedented intensity as new
offensives are being unleashed.9 There will, perforce, be little room
7 H. HAvIGH uRsr, THE NA-uRE OF PRIVATE CoNmhAcr 124-25 (1961).
s See Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59
Nw. U.L. RFV. 751 (1965). Professor Friedman, in this thoughtful article, refers to
historical examples of judicial and legislative erosion of the traditional doctrine
protecting holders in due course of negotiable instruments executed by consumers.
He cites a 1901 Wisconsin statute which required "that any promissory note 'taken
or given for any lightning rod, patent, patent right, stallion, or interest therein' must
bear on its face 'in red ink' the words:. 'The consideration for this note is the sale of a
lightning rod, patent, patent right, stallion, or interest therein.' Notes subject to the
statute were non-negotiable." He comments: "The seemingly strange Wisconsin list
was actually a catalogue of some common ways in which certain smooth operators
induced farmers to part with their hard-earned money." Id. at 758-59.
9 Potentially, the most significant is the draft of a Uniform Consumer Credit
Code being prepared under the auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. This "UC" will be a comprehensive regulatory statute
touching many aspects of consumer credit, incidental features of which will be to
limit substantially the use of waiver-of-defense clauses and negotiable instruments in
consumer transactions. See Jordan and Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for
Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 441 (1967). As an aside, a friend re-
marked that to be exposed to a U.C.C.C. after just becoming accustomed to the U.C.C.
is apt to make one "C"-sickl [See note 1 to Prof. Spanogle's article, this issue.-Eo.].
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for neutral observers, and, to leave the metaphor, debate on all
aspects of all questions becomes imperative.
Turning, first, to waiver-of-defense clauses, what are the ob-
jectives of those who would deny parties the freedom to agree, in a
sales contract, that ordinary defenses available against the seller
cannot be asserted against his transferee? Many arguments have
been advanced in the legal periodical literature and the cases, rang-
ing from an insistence that such clauses are per se objectionable as
violative of public policy to a claim that the use of such clauses in
certain types of transactions (notably, consumer sales) is unfair and
the practice should be curtailed. For example, it has been said that
such clauses are violative of public policy as attempts to confer
negotiability upon writings without compliance with formalities pre-
scribed by statute.'0 But while some insist that these clauses are in-
herently objectionable, most of the criticism is based upon their use
in consumer sales where they are made part of standard form con-
tracts which are often never read or understood by the purchaser."1
This case for abolition draws heavily upon market experience which
10 Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th
Cir. 1941); American Nat'l Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376
(1923); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 P. 705 (1931); In.
dustrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). See also Quality
Finance Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958).
11 Conditional sale contracts are invariably written by sellers and finance
companies for sellers and finance companies. They are often printed in un-
conscionably small type and presented to the buyer as a mere formality to be
gotten out of the way after the parties have come to terms on price. Some.
times they are not even identified as conditional sale contracts but are
euphemistically labeled "Easy Payment Plan" or something of the sort. The
seller is usually justified in believing either that the buyer will not read the
contract at all or will not understand it if he does wade through it. Even were
the buyer to read and comprehend the avalanche of legal consequences which
would greet any default on his part, there is not much he can do about It,
for if he wants to buy an automobile or an appliance of some sort . . . on the
installment plan he must sign one conditional sale contract or another, and
they are all pretty much alike. There is no indication that competition in the
automobile or appliance businesses, however keen, has extended to the point
where dealers attempt to attract buyers by offering them a more favorable
contract. It is against this background that we must view the plight of
[a buyer] who staggers into a contract which could make him liable to pay
the full price of an air-conditioning unit to a finance company, with which he
had not even directly dealt, even though the vendor sells him a defective
article ....
Warren, Tools of Chattel Security Transactions in Illinois, 1956 ILL. LAW FoRUMr 531,
543.
U3C AND NEGOTIABILITY
strongly indicates a lack of awareness on the part of the consumer
and consequent absence of meaningful negotiation regarding such
clauses. This data leads to a re-examination of freedom of contract
in this context. It is contended that these clauses are hardly ever the
product of informed, voluntary choice; hence, their invalidation in
no way diminishes genuine free choice. There are others, of course,
who believe that freedom of contract is too highly touted anyway,
being based, it is sometimes said, on a now discredited laissez-faire
economics. 2 Increasingly, writers are placing this and other related
questions within the larger frame of consumer protection as an
avowed effort to secure "social justice" for the impoverished. 13 The
abolition of the waiver clause is thus viewed as but one step, and
perhaps a minor one, in an all-out program for the protection of "un-
organized consumers."' 4 The goal is sometimes stated in terms of
equalizing the bargaining power of the participants,15 the arguments
here being reminiscent of the labor law debates of the 30's.
The related question of using negotiable promissory notes in
consumer sales involves virtually the same policy cdnsiderations.
Again, it is urged that the use should be prohibited outright. The
most telling objection is that ordinarily the buyer is not aware of the
legal effect of signing a negotiable note.'0 It is argued the average
buyer does not, and cannot be expected to, realize that defenses
which he has against the merchant might not be available in a suit
by the holder. One judicial critic said: "The average citizen, and
particularly the financially unimportant, [is] no more likely to know
12 E.g., Shuchman, Consumer Credit By Adhesion Contracts, 35 Tr.mr. L.Q. 125
(1962).
13 E.g., Willging, Installment Credit: A Social Perspective, 15 CAnioLc. U.L Ry.
45 (1965).
14 See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Pro-
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Ray. 895 (1966). Frequent reference is made in
contemporary literature to the "unorganized" consumers. Perhaps President Kennedy
set the style in his 1962 message to Congress concerning consumer programs: "Con-
sumers, by definition, include us all. They are the largest economic group in the
economy, affecting and affected by almost every public and private economic dedsion.
Two-thirds of all spending in the economy is by consumers. But they are the only
important group in the economy who are not effectively organized ... : 108 Co.qc.
Rc. 4167 (1962).
15 E.g., Note, New Consumer Credit Reforms in Illinois, 17 Dz PAUL L. R E. 194
(1967).
16 See Friedman, supra note 8. Professor Friedman, recalling the law merchant
origins of negotiable instruments, reminds us that the rules of negotiable instruments
were originally "class rules," binding only that group (merchants) who could be
expected to know the legal effect of such instruments.
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the law of negotiable paper... than the holding in Shelley's Case."1
But even if, perchance, the buyer should know something of the law
of negotiable paper (as, for example, that a failure of consideration
defense cannot be successfully interposed in a suit by a holder in due
course) it is nonetheless inappropriate to apply that law in the usual,
garden-variety case. This argument relies heavily upon the history of
negotiable instruments. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that it was
the facilitation of negotiation that precipitated recognition of the
negotiable note. It was desirable that these instruments be able to
circulate freely; hence, impediments were discouraged. But, it is
argued, in consumer cases it is rare that the instrument travels
beyond the safe of the first transferee, the financial institution which
purchases the paper from the merchant. Thus, the basic reason for
insulating the holder from defenses the maker has against the payee
vanishes. Ergo ... cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.' s
Supporting reasons for denying holder in due course status to
the purchaser of consumer paper are of a more pragmatic nature. To
deprive the consumer of the right to withhold payment is to deprive
him of the most potent weapon he has to enable him to receive that
which he was promised. Although he does retain his right to proceed
against the merchant after making payment to the financer, this,
realistically, may be quite illusory. Apart from the burden of secur-
ing legal representation (the cost of which may be prohibitive in
light of the amount involved), there is no assurance that a judgment
against the merchant can be collected. By contrast, one could reason-
ably expect a financial institution both to investigate carefully the
merchants from whom it buys paper and to arrange for reimburse-
ment (through repurchase agreements, reserve accounts, buying the
note with recourse, etc.) for losses sustained by reason of the mer-
chants' defaults.' 9 The added cost to the financer might ultimately
result, because of higher discount rates, in increased costs to con-
sumers, but this, on balance, is still a more intelligent way to proceed.
Better to have the financial institution bear this cost initially; it is
usually in a better position to absorb the cost and can spread the
17 Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 743, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 785
(Buffalo City Ct. 1937).
18 The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself ceases. See Jones, Finance Corn-
panies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WAsU. U.L.Q. 177. Professor
Jones calls this the problem of . . . the negotiable instrument which is never ne.
gotiated." Id. at 191.
19 See Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective Goods,
102 U. PA. L. Ryv. 782, 791-93 (1954).
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risk over the entire business. Finally, it is contended that the ex-
perience in states where the financer does not obtain holder in due
course status does not indicate that the consequences are such as to
either curtail the purchase of consumer paper or significantly in-
crease the costs.20
III. " . . . Is PROCEEDING IN THESE DAYS APACE."
How have the foregoing arguments, or variants thereof, fared
in the courts and in the legislative assemblies? There is, first of all, a
trend in the cases favoring some circumscription of holder in due
course status for financial institutions purchasing consumer paper
from merchants.21 Likewise, there is legislation of comparatively
20 Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transac-
tions, 8 B.C. IND. & Coat. L. REv. 535, 551-52 (1967); Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Ex-
perience and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L. Rxv. 2 0, 239-40; Vernon, Priorities, the
Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financing, 4 B.C. I.D. & Coat. L. REv. 531,
547 (1963).
It has been suggested that from both the buyer's and financing agency's
point of view, the issues of negotiability and waiver of defense have been
greatly exaggerated in importance. It is said that the financing agency, prior
to asserting its rights against the buyer, will attempt to settle honest claims
by having the dealer make appropriate adjustments, thereby preserving the
latter's reputation in the community. Failing this, resort will be had to the
dealer's reserve account or his recourse indorsement. Only in cases where the
dealer is insolvent, or where the financing agency and he are united in
interest, will the buyer be called upon to make good his promise even though
the seller has not performed his part of the bargain. Thus, it is argued, only
in an infinitesimal number of retail installment sale transactions is the buyer
harmed by his agreement to waive his defenses or by having given a negotiable
instrument.
Conceding that no protection is needed in the vast majority of cases, pro-
tection in the remaining ones must come from the legislature, for it is also
agreed that the buyer is unable to provide it for himself. Moreover, to say
that the problem is not substantial is to look only to the reported decisions,
few in number. It is to overlook the larger number of cases which either
never reach an appellate level or never go to trial. The buyer who is being
protected by retail installment legislation is normally one who cannot
afford the luxury of a lawsuit and may, therefore, be forced as a practical
matter to submit to the demands of the financing agency though he has an
otherwise valid claim.
Project, Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L. RMV 618,
750 (1960).
21 For exhaustive annotation, see 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955) and supplemental material.
See also Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper,
1958 WAsH. U.LQ. 176, for a comprehensive survey of judicial opinion dealing with
this subject.
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recent vintage withdrawing such status. 22 A concomitant trend, in
both case law and legislation, can be discerned as regards waiver-of-
defense clauses.2 Indeed, the most striking development of all has
been the emergence of important statutes prohibiting or limiting
the use of waiver clauses in various types of consumer transactions.2 4
22 Cal. Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1803.2(a), 1810.9 (West
Supp. 1967); Conn. Home Solicitation Sales Act, PuB. Act 749 (West Conn. Leg. Set.
1063, 1967); Del. Retail Installment Sales Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4342 (West
Supp. 1966); Hawaii Retail Installment Sales Act, HAWAII Rxv. LAws § 201A-17(d)
(Supp. 1965); Ill. Consumer Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212, § 262D (Smilth-Hurd
Supp. 1967); Md. Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1957);
Mich. Home Improvement Finance Act, Micir. Comp. LAWS § 445.1207 (1967); N.Y.
Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 403(l), (2) (McKinney, 1962);
Pa. Home Improvement Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-207 (Supp. 1967);
Pa. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(g) (1965); Pa. Goods
and Services Installments Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1302, 1909 (Supp. 1967); Vt.
Consumer Fraud Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1967); Wash. Credit Disclosure
Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.14020 (Supp. 1967). Cf. Ill. Retail Installment Sales
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212 § 517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Ill. Motor Vehicle Sales
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, § 576 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
23 See 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 92-96, 162-72 (1955) and supplemental material.
24 Alaska Retail Installment Sales Act, ALASKA STAT. § 45.10.140 (1962); Cal. Auto.
mobile Sales Finance Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.5 (West Supp. 1967); Cal. Retail
Installment Sales Act, CAL. CxV. CODE §§ 1804.1-.2 (West Supp. 1967); Conn. Home
Solicitation Sales Act, Pun. Acr 749 (West Conn. Leg. Ser. 1063, 1967); Del. Retail
Installment Sales Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4311-2 (West Supp. 1966); Hawail
Retail Installment Sales Act, HAWAI REV. LAWs § 201A-17(d) (Supp. 1965); Ill. Con-
sumer Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121V, § 262D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967; Mass.
Retail Installment Sales and Services Act, MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 255D, § 10 (1968);
Mich. Home Improvement Finance Act, MicH. Coazp. LAws §§ 445.1206, 445.1208
(1967); Mich. Retail Installment Sales Act, MicH. CoirP. LAWs §§ 445.864, -5 (1967);
Miss. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, Miss. CODE ANN. § 8075-13 (Supp. 1966); Nev.
Retail Installment Sale of Goods and Services Act, NEv. REV. STAT. § 97.275 (1965);
N. Mex. Retail Installment Sales Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-5 (Supp. 1967); N.Y.
Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PEgs. PROP. LAW § 403(1), (2) (McKinney, 1962);
N.Y. Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. Pins. PROP. LAW § 302
(McKinney Supp. 1967); Pa. Home Improvement Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 500-409 (Supp. 1967); Pa. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 615 (1965); Pa. Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,
§§ 1401, 1402 (1967); Tex. Retail Installment Sales Act, TEX. REv. Civ. STATS. ANN. art.
5069-6.07 (Vern. Supp. 1967); Tex. Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, TEx. REv. Civ,
STATS. ANN. art. 5069-7.07, -8 (Vern. Supp. 1967); Vt. Consumer Fraud Act, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1967); Wash. Credit Disclosure Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 63.14.020 (Supp. 1967). Cf. Il. Retail Installment Sales Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. cli. 121%,
§ 517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Il1. Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, ILL,
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 576 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
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A. Judicial Developments
A 1967 decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Unico v.
Owen,25 is illustrative of a developing judicial "ttitude. The case has
the classic syndrome--(1) enticement by advertising (140 albums of
stereophonic records for 698 dollars, plus a Motorola stereo record
player "without separate charge"); (2) seller's agent contacting
customer at home, with the resultant execution of a printed form
"retail installment contract" or time payment plan and a negotiable
promissory note; (8) fine print clauses in the contract, including an
undertaking by the buyer "not to set up any claim against such
seller as a defense, counterclaim or offset to any action by any as-
signee for the unpaid balance of the purchase price or for possession
of the property"; (4) the immediate assignment of the contract and
negotiation of the note to the plaintiff finance company (on forms
supplied by the plaintiff and with the latter's name printed as as-
signee); (5) the subsequent realization by the buyer that written
terms were not congruent with what he was led to believe on the
basis of the advertisement; (6) the seller's subsequent insolvency
and default in performance;2 6 and (7) the plaintiff, as assignee of the
contract and holder of the note suing for the balance due, claiming
that failure of consideration is unavailing as a defense in view of
(a) the waiver clause in the contract and (b) its status as holder in
due course of the note.
The defendant won in the trial court, and the appellate division
affirmed. The supreme court's affirmation was accompanied by an
opinion of Justice Francis, speaking for a unanimous court. Justice
25 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
26 The lack of congruence between advertisement and contract was striking.
Instead of a "free stereo" accompanying the purchase of 140 record albums for the
price of 698 dollars, there was an agreement to pay 819.72 dollars over a three year
period in monthly installments of 22.97 dollars. The 819.72 dollars included cash price
of 698 dollars, "official fee" of 1A0 dollars (presumably cost of recording contract in
County Register's Office) and "time price differential" or interest of 150.32 dollars,
less 30 dollars down payment. More significantly, while the payments were to be
made over a three-year period, the delivery of the albums, at the rate stipulated in
the contract (12 at the inception, 12 at six month intervals) would take five years and
four months[ As the court remarked, "this means that 40% of the albums, although
fully paid for, would still be in the hands of the seller." Id. at 107-08, 232 A.2d at 409.
The buyer received the stereo player and the original 12 albums, but despite his
continuing to pay 12 monthly installments (total 303.24 dollars, including 30 dollars
down payment) he never received another album. The deliveries ceased because of the
seller's insolvency.
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Francis, it will be recalled, was the author of the opinion in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.27 Henningsen proved to be a most
potent weapon in the."assault upon the citadel of privity." It is quite
possible that Unico, like Henningsen, will become a landmark.
Neither opinion breaks new ground or offers a startlingly innova-
tive approach, but each is a forthright, carefully documented exposi-
tion that comes along at a propitious moment.
The court was able to point to a significant and growing body of
case precedent, where, in comparable situations, the plaintiff failed
to qualify as a holder in due course.28 In general, this refusal to
insulate the holder from ordinary personal defenses of the maker
(failure of consideration, breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, etc.) has been predicated upon the "dose connection,"
"participation" or "involvement" of the holder in the transaction
as indicative of a lack of good faith.29
This fascinating chapter of negotiable instruments law began
with Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,80 a 1940 decision of the
Arkansas Supreme Court. It was a typical transaction: Buyer executes
a conditional sales contract and installment note; Dealer sells the
paper to Finance Company. What was atypical was Buyer's ability to
assert against Finance Company a defense based on Dealer's fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. The defense was not one which could, by
statute, be asserted against a holder in due course absent a showing
of actual knowledge. The court explained its position as follows:
We think appellant was so closely connected with the entire
transaction or with the deal that it can not be heard to say that
it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of the instrument for
value before maturity. It financed the deal, prepared the instru-
ment, and on the day it was executed took an assignment of it
from [the dealer]. Even before it was executed it prepared the
written assignment thereon to itself. Rather than being a pur-
chaser of the instrument after its execution it was to all intents
27 32 N.J. 858, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
28 The note was executed on November 6, 1962, after New Jersey had adopted
the U.C.C. but before its effective date of January 1, 1963. Therefore, the requirements
of due course holding were those specified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act.
29 See note 21 supra.
30 199 Ark. 1078, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 215 Mo.
App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1928), can be viewed as an antecedent of Childs, but the court
in Taylor emphasized evidence from which actual knowledge of the dealer's fraud
could be inferred. See Note, Finance Company as a Holder in Due Corse, 28 Nour
pAM4E LAwYE, 251 (1953).
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and purposes a party to the agreement and instrument from the
beginning.& 3
The wedge had entered. Hereafter, counsel throughout the
country would be citing Childs. The effort would prove futile in
most cases, but there would be notable successes as well. Moreover,
as time goes on the rationale for a Childs-like approach becomes more
explicitly keyed to considerations of consumer protection. For ex-
ample, in Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,2 an influential Florida case,
the court remarked:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in
business methods and will impose a greater burden on the
finance companies. We think the buyer-Mr. & Mrs. General
Public-should have some protection somewhere along the line.
We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk
of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better
position to protect his interests against unscrupulous and in-
solvent dealers.33
The "dose participation" doctrine thus emerged and developed
within the context of consumer financing where the goods are
purchased for personal, family or household purposes. This is not to
say that the doctrine has not been implemented in non-consumer,
commercial cases, or that the requisite participation or involvement
might not there be sufficient to negate good faith on the part of the
transferee.34 But it is in the consumer area that the underlying
rationale seems most persuasive and where the impact has been the
greatest. For example, in Unico v. Owen, the New Jersey court, after
stating that it was "concerned here with a problem of consumer goods
financing,"3 5 proceeded, after the fashion of Henningsen, to detail
reasons for the special treatment of standardized financing contracts
involving the consumer goods purchaser. The issue was posed as
the basic problem in consumer goods sales and financng... of
balancing the interest of the commercial community in un-
restricted negotiability of commercial paper against the interest
of installment buyers of such goods in the preservation of their
normal remedy of withholding payment when, as in this case,
31 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 1077, 137 SAV.2d 260, 262 (1940).
32 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Sup. Ct 1953).
33 Id. at 653.
34 E.g., International Finance Corp. v. Rieger. 272 Minn. 192, 137 NV.2d 172
(1965); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214
P.2d 819 (1950).
35 Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 110, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967).
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the seller fails to deliver as agreed, and thus the consideration
for his obligation fails.8 6
A similar emphasis upon the consumer aspects of the transaction
is discernible in the court's invalidation of the waiver-of-defense
clause. It took cognizance of section 9-206(1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code which provides that "[s]ubject to any statute or deci-
tion which establishes a different rule for buyers of consumer goods"
(emphasis added), a waiver-of-defense clause is valid. "In this section
of the Code," the court states, "the Legislature recognized the pos-
sibility of need for special treatment of waiver clauses in consumer
goods contracts." 87 After referring also to section 2-302 of the Code
pertaining to "unconscionable contracts," the court concludes: "We
see in the enactment of these two sections of the Code an intention
to leave in the hands of the courts the continued application of com-
mon law principles in deciding in consumer goods cases whether
such waiver clauses as the one imposed on Owen in this case are so
one-sided as to be contrary to public policy."88
B. Legislative Response
The references in Unico to the Uniform Commercial Code are
most interesting. For this whole debate began in earnest in the
councils of the U.C.C. drafting committees, and it continues in the
discussions of those presently putting together the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code. It is against the background of this protracted
conflict of opinion that one can perhaps best evaluate the legislative
response to the use of negotiable notes and waiver clauses in con-
sumer sales.
The original design of the Uniform Commercial Code, as it
appeared in the May 1949 draft, included significant sections regulat-
ing consumer financing.8 9 Among these was a provision subjecting
the holder in due course of a consumer's note to the latter's contract
defenses if rights were asserted against the collateral. 40 In an earlier
version the Code also purported to make more difficult the attain-
ment of due course status by adding to the ordinary subjective test
of good faith ("honesty in fact") an objective standard (observance of
"reasonable commercial standards").41 Moreover, the draftsmen
36 Id. at 112, 232 A.2d at 411.
37 Id. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418.
38 Id.
39 UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-601 et seq. (May 1949 Draft).
40 Id. § 7-612.
41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 (1952 Official Text).
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undertook to deal decisively with waiver clauses in consumer con-
tracts. Section 9-206 of the 1952 Official Text provided as follows:
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the con-
tract of sale that he will not assert against an assignee any claim
or defense arising out of the sale is not enforceable by any
person. If such a buyer as part of one transaction signs both a
negotiable instrument and a security agreement even a holder
in due course of the negotiable instrument is subject to such
claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce the security interest
either by proceeding under the security agreement or by attach-
ing or levying upon the goods in an action upon the instru-
ment.4
By these and related sections the Code authors took a firm
stance in favor of regulating for the protection of consumer interests.
But, due primarily to the exigencies of securing that consensus
believed necessary for legislative success, they acceded to demands
that these provisions be deleted or modified.43 Those provisions in
the original draft pertaining explicitly to consumer transactions
were omitted from subsequent drafts. The standard of good faith
for due course holding was modified to exclude the objective cri-
teria introduced by the requirement of observance of "reasonable
commercial standards."44 And, most importantly, there was a basic
restructuring of section 9-206 relative to waiver clauses, the effect of
which was to positively encourage their use. Section 9-206(1) was
amended to read as follows:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a dif-
ferent rule for buyers of consumer goods, an agreement by a
buyer that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller is enforceable by an
assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a
type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper
(Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both
a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an
agreement 4 5
42 Id. § 9-205.
43 1 G. GuruoRE, SEcurry INTEaRs iN PERSONAL PROPERTY 9293-94 (1965); Kripke,
The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 ILL.
LAW FORUM 321, 323; Skilton and Helstead, Protection of the Installment Buyer of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Micit. L. REv. 1465, 1468 (1967).
44 UNixoiu Con u:xCsLA CODE § 3-302 (1957 Official Text). For a critique, see
Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subfeetive
Test, 39 S. CAr. L. REv. 48 (1966).
45 UuNrom CommExcLsL CODE § 9-206 (1957 Official Text).
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It was in this form that the section was enacted throughout the
country.48 In sum, the more conspicuous regulatory elements were
excised, and the overall thrust of the Code became decidedly one of
facilitation rather than regulation.47
However, the effort for uniform regulation was resumed in
1964 as work began on the preparation of what will shortly be
proposed for legislative adoption as the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.48 This Code will regulate the whole spectrum of consumer
credit, and it is understandable that consideration will again be
given to the use of negotiable notes and waiver clauses in consumer
transactions.
In the First Tentative Draft of the UC, released in 1966, there
were a number of proposed limitations upon creditors' remedies.
One prohibited negotiable instruments in consumer credit sales
altogether and another subjected a transferee to "all claims and
defenses of the debtor against the seller arising out of the sale not-
withstanding an agreement to the contrary."40
40 All states except Louisiana have adopted the U.C.C.
47 See generally Murphy, Facilitation and Regulation in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 41 NOTRE DAmE LAwY.R 625 (1966).
48 The USC is a project of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws, a cosponsor of the U.C.C. The Special Committee charged with drafting
responsibilities has, as of this writing (February, 1968), produced six "working drafts."
The First Tentative Draft (Working Draft No. 1) was submitted to the National
Conference as a Committee of the Whole at the 1966 annual meeting in Montreal.
The Second Tentative Draft (Working Draft No. 4) was considered at the 1967 meeting
in Hawaii. It is anticipated that a proposed final draft will be ready for promulgation
by the National Conference at its annual meeting this August in Philadelphia. See
Buerger, Uniform Law Commissioners' Consumer Credit Project-4th Year, 20 PzRs.
FiN. LAw Q. REv. 84 (1966); Dunham, Second Draft of Proposed Uniform Consumer
Credit Code Now Being Considered, 21 Pans. FiN. LAw Q. REv. 75 (1967), Harper,
Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Discussed at Annual Meeting of NCCUSL
in Hawaii, 21 PEas. FiN. LAw Q. REV. 119 (1967).
49 Section 6.101 [Negotiable Instruments Prohibited.] In a consumer credit
sale it is a violation of this Code for the seller to accept a negotiable instru-
ment as evidence of the obligation of the debtor. If the face of the instrument
bears the words "consumer note" the instrument is not negotiable, An
instrument negotiable in form issued in violation of this section may be en-
forced as a negotiable instrument by a holder in due course according to
its terms. The holder in due course is not subject to ,my of the liabilities
set forth in section 6.201 and 7.204.
Section 6.102 [Transferee Subject to Defenses Against Seller]. Except as
provided in section 6.101, with respect to a consumer credit sale a transferee
of the seller's rights is subject to all claims and defenses of the debtor against
the seller arising out of the sale notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary.
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The draftsmen made their point unmistakable-negotiable
notes and waiver-of-defense clauses have no place in consumer sales
transactions. Of course, this thesis did not go unchallenged. The
most controversy centered upon the treatment of waiver clauses,
perhaps reflecting the fact that most sales financing today does not
utilize a note, but relies upon a contract which includes a waiver
clause. 50 This practice probably resulted in part from the encourage-
ment of such clauses by section 9-206 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and also from a fear that because of the battering sustained in
Childs and its progeny the holder in due course doctrine in con-
sumer sales was rather shaky anyway. Hence, the fire was directed
primarily against the provision subjecting a transferee to "all claims
and defenses of the debtor against the seller arising out of the sale
notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary." Some critics seized
upon the reference to "claims" of the debtor. Would this mean, for
example, that the transferee could be sued for the dealer's breach of
warranty? 5 1
By this time (1966) there were a number of state statutory pro-
visions, found usually in Retail Installments Sales Acts, limiting the
use of waiver clauses.52 A few statutes prescribed outright abolition. 3
Others made validity dependent upon compliance with a notice
requirement.5 For example, under the New York statute the buyer
was given ten days after receiving notice of the assignment within
which to notify the assignee of "facts giving rise to the claim or de-
fense" or otherwise lose the right to assert against the assignee any
50 Based on interviews with Mr. Max A. Denney, Executive Vice President,
American Industrial Bankers Association, and Mr. Paul R. Moo, South Bend attorney
and member of the Advisory Committee of the U3C project.
51 If so construed, this would open the possibility of recovery against the trans-
feree of an amount in excess (perhaps far in excess) of the outstanding balance due
from the buyer.
52 See generally B. CuA, TRExNs IN CoNsu.mm Casrr LEcisrAmIoN (1965).
53 Alaska (Retail Installments Sales Act, 1962); Massachusetts (Retail Installment
Sales and Services Act, 1966); Mississippi (Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. 1958);
Nevada (Retail Installment Sale of Goods and Services Act, 1965); New Mexico (Retail
Installment Sales Act, 1965. For citations, see note 24 supra.
54 California (Retail Installment Sales Act, 1959; Automobile Sales Finance Act.
1961); Delaware (Retail Installment Sales Act, 1960); Hawaii (Retail Installment Sales
Act, 1963); Michigan (Retail Installment Sales Act, 1965; Home Improvement Finance
Act, 1965); New York (Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, 1956; Retail Install-
ment Sales Act, 1957); Pennsylvania (Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, 1947; Home
Improvement Finance Act, 1963; Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, 1966). For
citations, see note 24 supra.
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right of action or defense arising out of the sale which he might
have against the seller.55
Other states had joined the ranks of these states or were in the
process of doing so when the Second Tentative Draft of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code was released in 1967.50 The negotiable note
section, changed slightly, now reads as follows:
Section 2.403. [Negotiable Promissory Notes Prohibited.]
In a consumer credit sale or consumer lease the seller or lessor
may not take a promissory note payable to order or to bearer as
evidence of the obligation of the debtor. A promissory note pay-
able to order or to bearer and otherwise negotiable in form
issued in violation of this section may be enforced as a negotiable
instrument by a holder in due course according to its terms. The
holder in due course is not subject to any of the liabilities set
forth in Section 5.201, 6.108(2) and 6.113(l).57
This section would seem to make virtually impossible the attainment
of holder in due course status by the dealer's transferee. For the
latter would in the ordinary situation know that the underlying
transaction was a "consumer credit sale or consumer lease" and
would be presumed to know that the law prohibits the seller from
taking a negotiable note in such a transaction. This may not be true
as regards a transferee farther down the line, and the statute seem-
ingly recognizes the possibility of such a person qualifying and
proceeding as a holder in due course.
The waiver provision was revised. Waiver clauses were outlawed,
as before, and the transferee was subjected to "all claims and defenses
of the debtor." But it was provided that "the transferee's liability...
may not exceed the amount owing to the transferee at the time the
claim or defense is asserted against the transferee." To further
clarify this it was stated that the "[r]ights of the debtor under this
section can only be asserted as a matter of defense to a claim by the
transferee."15 8 A proposal to offer, as an alternative, a provision pat-
55 N.Y. PEPS. PROP. LAW § 403(3) (1967).
56 In 1967 statutes invalidating waiver clauses were passed in Connecticut (Home
Solicitation Sales Act), Vermont (Consumer Fraud Act), and Washington (Credit Dis.
closure Act). Notice type provisions were enacted in Illinois (Consumcr Fraud Act)
and Texas (Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act; Retail Installment Sales Act).
Finally, two states shifted from notice type provisions to outright abolition: California
(Retail Installment Sales Act) and Hawaii (Retail Installment Sales Act). For citations,
see note 24 supra.
57 UNIFORM CONSUMER CRErr CODE § 2.403 (Second Tentative Draft, 1967).
58 Id. § 2.404.
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terned upon the New York statute (but with 45 instead of 10 days as
the "cut-off period") was rejected.5 9
The Committee of the Whole, meeting in Hawaii in August,
1967, went over the draft, and there emerged from this meeting yet
another revision of the waiver clause provision. It was a compromise.
Instead of the single provision, alternatives were adopted. Alterna-
tive A, incorporating the notice requirement but with a substantially
longer time period (six months), is as follows:
Section 2-404. [Transferee Not Subject to Defenses Against
Seller if Proper Notice of Transfer Given to Buyer.] (1) With
respect to a consumer credit sale or lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, an agreement by the
buyer or lessee not to assert against a transferee a claim or
defense arising out of the sale or lease is enforceable only by a
transferee not related to the seller or lessor who acquires the
buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith and for value, who gives
the buyer or lessee notice of the transfer as provided in this sec-
tion and who, within 6 months after the mailing of the notice of
transfer, receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the
buyer's or lessee's claim or defense. The notice of transfer shall
be in writing and addressed to the buyer or lessee at his address as
stated in the contract, identify the contract, describe the goods
or services, state the names of the seller or lessor and buyer or
lessee, the name and address of the transferee, the amount pay-
able by the buyer or lessee and the number, amounts and due
dates of the instalments, and contain a conspicuous notice to
the buyer or lessee that he has 6 months within which to notify
the transferee in writing of any complaints, claims or defenses
he may have against the seller or lessor and that if written noti-
fication of the complaints, claims or defenses is not given within
the six-month period, the transferee will have the right to en-
force the contract free of any claims or defenses the buyer or
lessee may have against the seller or lessor.
(2) A transferee does not acquire a buyer's or lessee's con-
tract in good faith within the meaning of subsection (1) if the
tranferee has knowledge or, from his course of dealing with the
seller or lessor or his records, notice of substantial complaints
by other buyers or lessees of the seller's or lessor's failure or re-
fusal to perform his contracts with them and of the seller's or
lessor's failure to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time
after the transferee notifies him of the complaints.6°
59 Id. § 2.404, Comment.
6o UNIFoRM CONSUMER CRErr CODE § 2.404 (Working Draft No. 6, 1967). Altcrna-
tive A. A comment appended to the waiver clause provision of the First Tentative Draft
referred to the notice type statutes as follows: "Several states, including New York
and California, have provisions requiring the buyer to give notice within a stated
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Alternative B, substantially the same as the provision in the
Second Tentative Draft, reads as follows:
Section 2.404. [Transferee Subject to Defenses.) With respect
to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or
lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, a transferee of the
rights of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims and defenses
of the buyer or lessee against the seller or lessor arising out of
the sale or lease notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary,
but the transferee's liability under this section may not exceed
the amount owing to the transferee at the time the claim or
defense is asserted against the transferee. Rights of the buyer or
lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter of de-
fense to or set-off against a claim by the transferee.01
The compromise of offering alternative formulations was pre-
ceded by a public hearing in June, 1967, in Chicago and by debate
in the Committee of the Whole meeting in Hawaii later that
summer. A culling of a few of the comments from these sessions may
be suggestive of what can be expected on this issue as the U3C
makes its way through legislative channels. The provision for aboli-
tion was hailed as "probably the most critically important to legal
aid clients as far as the provisions of the Code are concerned."0 2
Critics of the provision condemned it as the wrong approach which
"completely undoes the [Uniform Commercial] Code."08 It was
defended as an attempt "to push the policing of the schlock merchant
onto the private financial institutions, rather than let things roll
along to the point where somebody decides to set up all sorts of
regulatory commissions and regulatory bodies to punish the schlock
merchant."64 Another predicted it would "drive the small finance
period (commonly 10 or 15 days) to a transferee of defenses against the seller in order
to preserve these defenses against the transferee. Experience has shown that a period
of 10 or 15 days may be too short and that a period of at least 30 days may be desir-
able." UNIFORM CONSUMER CP.Drr CODE § 6.102, Comment (First Tentative Draft).
(emphasis added). The compromise incorporated in Working Draft No. 6 not only
adopted a "cut-off period" of six months, it also added, in subsection 2, an elabora-
tion of "good faith" which would make more difficult the transferee's acquiring In-
sulation against "claims and defenses" the buyer has against the seller. Finally, there
is no provision in Alternative A, as in Alternative B, limiting the buyer to asserting
his rights as a matter of defense or to set-off against a claim by the transferee.
61 Id. § 2A04, Alternative B.
62 Proceedings, Public Hearing on Second Tentative Draft of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code 212 (June 16-17, 1967).
03 Proceedings, Committee of the Whole, Uniform Consumer Credit Code 195
(August 1-3, 1967).
04 Id. at 196.
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companies out of business,"6 5 with the consequence that "people who
need financing most are going to be least likely to get it. . ..-66
Turning to the six month time period of Alternative A, some thought
the time too long ("I'm surprised to hear anything as long as six
months suggested."6 ), others thought there ought to be no time
limit at all, and still others believed the six month period to be
about right ("I feel that the alternative gives the buyer here a pretty
fair protection."68). Near the end of the debate on this section, one
man who thought the six month period too long ("If you can't find
out what the hell's wrong with the outfit in less than six months, you
are not very bright.. ."69) facetiously suggested: "Let's make it 123
days. That would be a unique provision.""7 The transcriber duly
noted the "laughter" which followed, and the Chairman proceeded
to call for a vote of the Committee. The compromise carried 26 to
18,71 and thus the matter stands until the next round.
IV. CONCLUSION
This movement to limit the use of negotiable notes and waiver-
of-defense clauses is indeed "proceeding in these days apace." As
noted, the judicial trend has been steady, if unspectacular. The
legislative response, on the other hand, has been both steady and
spectacular. New statutory provisions have appeared; old ones have
been strengthened7 2 One can reasonably expect this general legisla-
tive trend to continue. Finally, there is, waiting in the wings, the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which, when finally approved and
submitted for legislative adoption, will contain provisions sub-
stantially limiting, if not preventing completely, the use of negotiable
notes and waiver clauses in consumer transactions.
It is not a sufficient answer to say that the abolition of the
waiver clause limits freedom of contract. For in most cases these
clauses are found in standard form contracts which are not read or
65 Proceedings, Public Hearing on Second Tentative Draft of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code 217. (June 16-17, 1967).
66 Id.
67 Proceedings, Committee of the Whole, Uniform Consumer Credit Code 212
(August 1-3, 1967).
68 Id. at 210.
69 Id. at 216-17.
'0 Id. at 217.
71 Id. at 217-18.
72 Especially significant in this respect was the abandonment in two States of a
notice type waiver dause provision and the substitution of outright abolition. See
authorities cited, note 56 supra.
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understood by the consumer purchaser. While it may be affirmed as
a general proposition that there should be a goal of maximizing the
freedom of contracting parties to set the terms of their agreement,
and I do so affirm, just what is their agreement or contract in the
prototype transaction? This whole relationship of freedom of con-
tract and the standard form, adhesion-type contract, has long been
a matter of major concern. Actually, the basic question here is not
so much what contracting parties should be free to do, but whether
public authority should make available legal devices which afford
transferees extraordinary advantage. This is obvious in the case of
the negotiable instrument, the law from the beginning insisting upon
certain special requirements as to both form and method of negotia-
tion. But it is no less apparent as regards utilization of waiver-of-
defense clauses, wherein there is the achievement of a kind of "negoti-
ability by contract." Thus viewed, the issue is whether there is
sufficient reason to permit the transferee to assert a right superior
to that of his transferor. One important reason for supporting such
a view is that such permission would help to facilitate commercial
transactions. It would encourage the free flow of commerce, with the
consequence of lower credit costs for the consuming public.
This need not, and in my opinion, should not be posed as an
either-or question. For even if legislatures can be persuaded to in-
validate these waiver clauses, for example, might not the accomplish-
ment prove to be illusory? If lending institutions find the risks in the
purchase of consumer sales paper to be unacceptable, what will
prevent a shift to a pattern of direct lending, perhaps utilizing in-
novative procedures yet to be devised? To be sure, in implementing
such a shift there would be problems, legal and otherwise, but it is
surely an underestimation of business acumen and initiative to
believe the task to be impossible. Recently a very knowledgeable
observer reminded us of how the problem can shift almost as soon
as the solution is adopted, leaving a residue of "statutory obsoles-
cence." 73 Moreover, in terms of the interest in securing uniform
legislation on the point, there is no assurance that state legislatures
can be persuaded to outlaw waiver clauses completely. There is no
consensus favoring such action within the ranks of the U3C
drafting committees, and this presages difficulties in securing uniform
legislative acceptance.
Alternatives to all-out support or rejection should be considered,
not merely because of a desire to enhance the likeihood of wide-
73 Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 461 (1967).
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spread legislative success, but in an effort to provide the best method
of operation. A tested method is the type proposed as a USC alter-
native, the making of waiver-of-defense clauses subject to compliance
with a notice requirement which gives the buyer a certain number
of days to lodge complaints and thereby preserve defenses. Prescind-
ing, for the moment, from the "numbers game" (whether the cut-off
period should be 10 days as in New York, 45 days as in a Pennsylvania
statute, six months as in the U3G alternative, etc.), the basic ap-
proach has evident merit.74 It does not give carte blanche to the
transferee, nor does it make impossible the attainment of insulation
against buyer's defenses. Hopefully, it is possible to strike a balance
which will not significantly decrease the purchasing of consumer
sales paper or increase the costs thereof, while at the same time
affording the consumer reasonable protection.
How long should the cut-off period, the statute of limitations as
some have dubbed it, be? The danger here is that the figure will be
picked arbitrarily, or by hunch, rather than being based on relevant
supporting data. If this is not to occur, and if the spectacle of having
the compromise figure reflect no more than tactical give and take
between competing interests is to be avoided, more information will
have to be supplied. What kind of information? Basically, cost data,
both in terms of increased costs to the financers and the losses sus-
tained by consumers in being forced to pay without adequate re-
course against the dealer. What has been the effect upon the cost of
credit in those states where the use of waiver clauses or negotiable
notes has been circumscribed by statute? Does the consumer have to
pay more for credit? Does he have a more difficult time obtaining
credit? Has there been a squeeze-out of the small financer? Addi-
tionally, would it not be helpful, especially in setting a cut-off period
for waiver clauses, to have trustworthy data as to when dealer de-
faults and product defects ordinarily appear? To be sure, such
information would produce no more than a general pattern, but it
would be something to go on, certainly preferable to the apparent
74 "Claims of defective performance are thus available to the buyer for the
limited period, but the statute also protects the assignee from fictitious de-
fenses fabricated when the buyer discovers he is unable to pay the debt.
Where there are latent defects in the goods, the risk of suing the seller is
thrown upon the buyer, but considerations of the relative innocence of both
parties and the desirability of a free flow of this kind of paper makes the
provision seem meritorious."
Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CoNmu,,- L.Q. 38, 67
(1958).
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blank that appears now in the published materials. If industry repre-
sentatives believe the six-month period of the U3C alternative to be
unreasonably long, they would be well-advised to buttress their
arguments with supporting data of this type.
Anything less than total and complete invalidation of waiver-of-
defense clauses in consumer sales contracts will be viewed by many
as inconsistent with a commitment to "consumer protection." I
would submit that our commitment should not be to securing "pro-
tection" for the consumer, but "justice." The consumer is not entitled
to "protection"; he is, the same as everyone else, entitled to his due.
A waiver provision incorporating a reasonable cut-off period would
not be demonstrably unjust and would provide a feasible solution.
